A number of national educational organizations and individual authors have called for the use of information technology to radically reform higher education. Several projections of how this reformation will unfold are presented here. Three different approaches to critically assessing these projections are considered in this article, two briefly and one in more detail. Brief consideration is given to an approach based on educational values and to an approach based on cost/benefit analysis.
I think that much of higher education is going to disappear. I think that the only institutions that will be left, if we were to look in 2050, might be residential small colleges, and they'll become places in which young people of wealth would find themselves. Bright young people would be sent for a chance for a broader, longer education. And I think we'll be left with research universities. I think the reason for that is that you learn research by apprenticeship and we'll need for people to do that. I can't see any reason that any other sector of higher education would last. 1 Anothe purpose of envisioning and guiding future developments.
One document available from EDUCOM, "Using Information Technology to Enhance Academic Productivity," is authored by William Massey and Robert Zemsky. 2 Their case begins with two observations. The first is that there will be a huge, probably exponential, growth during the next decade in the demand for courses built upon information technology. The second is that no matter how higher education reacts, information technology will profoundly change teaching and learning, much as the printing press did. On the basis of these assumptions, Massey and Zemsky construct two alternative scenarios for the adoption of An Incrementalist View... information technology within higher education and explore the consequences of each.
In one
Information technology thus enhances productivity, providing a better ratio of costs to benefits, of inputs to outputs. However, this will require the substitution of technology for human capital and labor, which is to say, for existing faculty, administrators, and their traditional activities. Massey and Zemsky recognize that important questions are raised by this proposal.
The question remains: "What does an institution do with the faculty hours freed up by capital-labor substitution?" The saved hours might relieve shortages elsewhere in the institution, but this outcome becomes less likely if the institution's markets are not expanding. No financial savings accrue if the hours are simply redirected to departmental research as has been traditional in many institutions.... Faculty might take over duties now performed by staff, or regular faculty might displace auxiliary faculty, or the regular faculty might decrease in numbers. 3
Moreov mentors, counselors, curriculum designers, advisors, and evaluators. New technologies will allow students to separate these functions and to select and pay for only those desired. One must be careful to distinguish "contact" from "contact hours." "Some students will continue to want a traditional collegiate education with all of its socialization or "contact" while others will just want the certification, the "contact (or credit) hours." 4 Education for some will thus become a process of mere "credentialing."
Once productivity is defined as the ratio of inputs to outputs, three paths to improved productivity can be identified. The first ("doing more with more") occurs when increases in benefits outweigh increases in cost. The second ("doing less with less") results whenever modest reductions in benefits can be achieved with significant reductions in cost. The third ("doing more with less") requires that greater benefits are produced while costs remain constant or are An Incrementalist View... reduced. Massey and Zemsky acknowledge that productivity improvements achieved with information technology thus far are cases of doing more with more, and that, while this reinforces the prevailing faculty culture, this alternative is clearly flawed. Scarcity of resources will unacceptably limit development, and the lack of cost containment will frustrate the enterprise.
Not only is "doing more with less" the most promising path to productivity gains, but this path is virtually mandated by rising costs and increasing public scrutiny of education.
Under a second scenario, universities continue in a "business-as-usual" manner, implementing instructional technologies in piecemeal ways that support, rather than change, existing practices. Without that change, the authors forecast a number of ills. For example, the American public refuses to fund higher education at its current level of faculty-centered inefficiency, and ultimately the undergraduate education market is lost to innovative nontraditional providers. These ideas are echoed in Eli Noam's "Electronics and the Dim Future of the University" published in Science. Noam expects that once the university system's control over accreditation is weakened, "we may well have in the future a "McGraw-Hill University" awarding degrees or certificates, just as today, some companies offer in-house degree programs." 5 In Noam's analysis, the role of economics is clear, and on these grounds it is very doubtful whether the present system can continue.
The American Association of Higher Education's Project Future is also putting forward it's view of the coming revolution, particularly in respect to distance education.
In the past two years, American higher education's interest in distance education has exploded. Suddenly, the technology seems to be there; the economics look attractive; we're supposed to serve more students, especially adults, and find new markets and revenue streams. . . Many roads, it seems, lead to distance education. The new interest in distance education arouses both unrealistic hopes and unfounded fears. either they characterize the educational process (e.g., concern for the individual, the significance of human interaction), or they are expected to be adopted by students (e.g., fairness, honesty, respect). 9 It is this latter category of values that will be emphasized here, but in either form there have been many studies addressing value concerns both in pre-college settings and higher education. 10 Discussion of educational values is implicitly related to the distinction between the primary and secondary aims of education. Providing students with skills and knowledge relevant to some particular subject may be the primary aim of education, but more than this is expected. It is commonly expected that the educated person will be able to both cooperate with others and to compete fairly, to appreciate and participate in community discourse, to respect the diversity of viewpoints, to resolve disputes even-handedly, to make judgments independent of prejudice, etc. In short, we expect the educated person to have adopted general values such as honesty, responsibility, respect, and fairness. Nevertheless, there is no university course in this "subject."
Rather, these dispositions are learned via human interaction and the modelling of exemplary behavior, much of which occurs within classrooms in which other subjects are taught. This may make the "teaching" of these values secondary in some sense, yet even so they remain an essential component of education.
Likewise, the social dynamics of student-teacher interaction may play out primarily within the classroom and secondarily outside of that formal setting, yet that secondary interaction may be invaluable. For instance, Pascarella's review of over thirty studies concluded that "significant positive associations exist between extent and quality of student-faculty informal contact and students' educational aspirations, their attitude toward college, their academic achievement, intellectual and personal development, and their institutional persistence." 11
Finding
"secondary" outcomes are actually the primary aim of education. In The Ethics of Teaching, Strike and Soltis make exactly this point.
In our view, growth as a moral agent, as someone who cares about others and is willing and able to accept responsibility for one's self, is the compelling matter. Promoting this kind of development is what teachers ought to be fundamentally about, whatever else it is that they are about. We are first and foremost in the business of creating persons. It is our first duty to respect the dignity and value of our students and to help them to achieve their status as free, rational, and feeling moral agents. 12
Some have expressed concerns about the impact of distance education and other forms of computer technology on such aims, whether construed as being primary or secondary. Cuban's historical overview of technology in education, for instance, stresses that "researchers lack evidence that children exposed to machine interaction over long periods of time develop the full range of values, knowledge and skills expected by parents and the community". 13 The point here is not that computers can never be used in ways that secure these outcomes, but that these outcomes are linked to educational values and that they may be endangered by technological change in education. In response to these criticisms, Shrader-Frechette maintains that many of the flaws of RCBA can be rectified or diminished. Ethical weighting can be introduced to offset any blindness to such moral concerns as equity of distribution, rights, and obligations. That is, alternatives which serve such considerations can be counted more heavily than alternatives which do not.
Given this improvement, ethically weighted RCBA supports democratic decision making through the generation of multiple analyses serving different interests.
Moreover, the explicit structure of RCBA contributes to the avoidance of arbitrariness and to the democratic control of technology evaluation. For these reasons, Shrader-Frechette concludes that RCBA is the best procedure available whatever its drawbacks. In resp Attempting to control a technology is difficult, and not rarely impossible, because during its early stages, when it can be controlled, not enough can be known about its harmful social consequences to warrant controlling its development; but by the time these consequences are apparent, control has become costly and slow. 17
To escape this predicament, one must grapple with what Collingridge sees as the major horns of the dilemma. This requires either improving our powers of prediction or increasing our ability to change a technology once its flaws are apparent.
Most contemporary efforts focus on the first alternative, the prediction horn, and research in Bayesian decision theory provides an example of this. Collingridge claims that these attempts are futile and that the best means of resolving the dilemma is by tackling the control horn. The trick here is to react to (unpredictable) difficulties as they arise but to avoid the failures An Incrementalist View...
caused by the inflexibility of mature technologies. This is accomplished by developing technologies in ways that avoid rigidity and that maintain flexibility.
One way of understanding this is through the concept of corrigibility. Decisions to implement particular technologies vary in respect to ease of correction, and preference should be given to decisions whose flaws can be detected quickly and corrected easily. In many cases, ease of correction will be a function of the time required to detect errors. A decision whose flaws go unnoticed for long periods of time will be more difficult and costly to correct, often as a consequence of entrenchment. Technologies become entrenched as they become intertwined such that changing one technology requires changing others as well. This underscores the significance of monitoring ("the continuous scrutiny of a decision's real consequences with the aim of finding error"). 18
One must constantly remain on the lookout for signs that a particular decision is mistaken. Decisions which keep one's future options open and which involve systems that are easy to control should also be favored. Monitoring is perhaps the single most pertinent concept in this context. As
Collingridge and other incrementalists recommend, we should expect to be surprised, and rather than passively waiting for problems to arise we should implement monitoring along with the technology itself. Two points on this issue
should be noted immediately. First, the kind of monitoring required here differs from the standardly employed assessment of instructional computing, and second, effective monitoring forces an explicit consideration of value issues.
Both of these points deserve elaboration. and entrenchment need to be identified. In the rapidly moving world of computer technology, change is virtually assured, but changing some technologies is bound to cost more than changing others.
The relative role of humans and machines and how different mixes of responsibility will affect flexibility is also a key question. Human judgment is noted for versatility and its ability to cope with unexpected novelty.
Automated educational systems are noted for speed, consistency, and reliance on explicit, general rules. What combination of these human and machine capabilities is best suited for the degree of complexity, idiosyncrasy, and changeability inherent in the characteristics of students, subject matter, pedagogical technique, and educational institutions is yet to be determined.
This determination cannot be made without a good deal of practical experimentation. It is important not to convince ourselves via a limited number of hypothetical scenarios that the answers to these questions are in hand. Incrementalism's dim view of the reliability of prediction in this context appears to be justified. Massey and Zemsky begin their arguments with a pair of "observations" (that demand for instruction based on information technology will grow substantially and that information technology will profoundly change teaching and learning no matter what universities do). In fact, these are predictions. Incrementalism urges that they be recognized as such and that An Incrementalist View...
there is little reason to treat them as anything but speculation. By using the term 'observation', it is implied that the truth of these claims is apparent to all. This is not the case. A prediction's truth or falsity rests with the occurrence or non-occurrence of the predicted events. Prior to this, confidence in a prediction is based on the track record of the prognosticator and/or on the regularity of the system whose behavior is being forecast. Neither of those factors appear to carry much weight in this context. Massey and Zemsky's claims about the feasibility of doing more with less are not provided with any empirical support.
No examples are provided of information technology that has achieved this goal.
Economists are generally doubtful of new technology's ability to provide more productivity for less, and American businesses have had a difficult time documenting productivity gains due to computer technology. 23
In Concl usion degrees of human and machine interaction and responsibility works better than others is also crucial. This can be learned by slow change, careful scrutiny, and diversity of approach. None of this will yield the swift, radical change called for by technology zealots, but it is our best hope for a system which serves educational needs first and technological innovation second, rather than vice versa.
